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We’re a’ Jock Tamson’s Bairns!’ Race equality, migration and citizenship in 
Scotland and the UK 
 
Nasar Meer (Strathclyde University) 
  
Despite the referendum result, the ‘Scottish question’ is not going away and will soon be 
joined by the prospect of English devolution, the serious electoral presence of UKIP and a 
possible exit from the EU. While race and ethnicity is something that cuts across all of these 
political questions, it has been especially overlooked in the separate (though related) debates 
over Scottish nationalism and Scottish Independence. As David McCrone (2002: 304) once 
noted, race and ethnicity and constitutional issues continue ‘to fire past each other’, and tend 
to leave a space that is filled with a latent assumption that Scotland is pursuing a broadly 
‘civic’ – and therefore inclusive – programme. 
Social scientists broadly agree that all civic and political cultures are enmeshed in ethno-
national and religious histories, and even though we disagree over how and in what ways this 
matters we have largely parked the Scottish national question on race; left it in an 
‘impeccably civic’ lot, and spent much of our time (and research income) on hypothetical 
deliberations over possible constitutional configurations. 
Let me be clear, there is no reason to assume that Scotland is weaker on race equality policy 
than England: this is not a lazy complaint emanating from south of the border. On the 
contrary, in this short discussion, I want to explore how and why race matters in Scotland in a 
way that might highlight examples that the rest of the UK could learn from and, as much as 
anything else, lean toward the common Scots phrase that ‘We’re a’ Jock Tamson’s Bairns’; at 
least in the aspiration for race equality and wider notions of membership. This is not offered 
as an uncritical consideration, for in the second half of the essay I want to reflect on how 
prevailing hierarchies in Scottish nationhood sit at odds with how minority Scots (who 
overwhelmingly self-identify as Scottish) can claim – and therefore remake – Scottish 
nationhood. 
Race Equality Policies  
We have certainly come a long way since Martin MacEwen (1980) wondered whether ‘race-
relations’ in Scotland were best characterised by ‘ignorance or apathy’. This complaint looks 
out of place even though matters of equality were formally reserved to Westminster in the 
Scotland Act (1998). The UK has broadly understood tackling discrimination as something 
active in seeking to treat people equally rather than resting on a benign ideal of equal 
treatment. In theory at least, this reaches beyond how different groups might blend into 
society because we have group-specific instruments to outlaw discrimination based on 
gender, disability, age, sexual orientation and so forth, as well as monitoring the institutional 
under-representation among such groups (Meer 2010). Amongst this increasingly 
intersectional configuration, approaches to race equality have developed what Hepple (2011) 
calls an ‘unsettled apparatus’ that is also reflected min Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 
(c46), which incorporated the functions of the third Race-Relations Act (1976). Yet other 
developments can be traced to a distinctively Scottish, rather than UK, experience. 
Firstly, in terms of categories, successive Acts tackling religious bigotry and incitement to 
religious hatred have adopted tariffs and sanctions that make the treatment of religious 
discrimination more symmetrical to racial discrimination than is the case in England and 
Wales. While there is a lively debate over the form and scale of sectarianism in Scotland 
(Raab and Holligan 2012), Government initiatives, through legislation such as the Offensive 
Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, are 
innovative because they make special mention of religious discrimination, and offer 
equivalent protection on the grounds of race, colour, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
gender identity and disability. Moreover, the Scottish Government – unlike the rest of the UK 
– recognises Gypsies/Traveler groups as an ethnic minority, and the kinds of racialized 
discourses surrounding traveler communities are not part of acceptable debate in Scotland. 
Secondly, Scotland has retained a public commitment to race equality and explicitly sought to 
entrench its mainstreaming, while the Westminster government has encouraged its 
diminution. During the UK wide consultation on harmonizing different equality bodies and 
different equality legislation, a repeated concern was the risk of rolling back equality 
achievements. Even if there was no immediate ‘dilution’ and settlements were ‘levelled up’ 
across different grounds, when separate commissions were no longer able to agitate for 
equality on specific grounds, and when legislation became streamlined, a less favourable 
political administration in more cash-strapped times, one trying to out-flank the right-wing 
UKIP electoral presence whose cornerstone is opposition to migration, would encounter less 
resistance if they moved to undermine existing settlements. 
Craig and O’Neil (2013) point to these developments in England, noting the budget of the 
harmonised Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was quietly reduced by the 
coalition to the equivalent of less than one of its constituent bodies (from £70m when it 
started in 2007 to £17m presently).  While this affects Scotland, too, the Scottish Government 
has mitigated it by bolstering its commitment to equality. Thus, in May 2012, the Scottish 
government placed specific duties on public authorities, also known as the Scottish Specific 
Duties, which requiring a listed authority to publish a mainstreaming report on the progress it 
has made in integrating the three needs of the General Equality Duty (GED) to: (i) Eliminate 
unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimization; (ii) Advance equality of opportunity, 
and (iii) Foster good relations. 
This is in contrast to the discontinuation of statutory equality impact assessments in England, 
and marks a departure from understanding race equality as an unnecessary administrative 
burden in the way the Home Secretary Theresa May announced with her review of the 
public sector equality duty in the government’s ‘red tape reduction challenge’. 
Nonetheless, in 2012-13 in Scotland, recorded racist incidents numbered 4,628, ethnic 
penalties continue to permeate life chances in education and employment, and it is not yet 
clear how successfully, from a race equality perspective, the new Public Sector Equality 
Duty that accompanied the Equality Act 2010 has been embedded in Scotland. So whilst 
Scotland has much that is distinctive, it is uncertain how the various initiatives and policies 
intended to promote race equality are being delivered or indeed what the overall national 
trajectory is. This gap is precisely what my new project is seeking to address, namely how 
approaches to race equality are developing in the context of a restored national parliament, 
fifteen years of devolution and the prospect of further political self-governance. 
Migration and Citizenship 
It is important not to overstate divergence in Scotland. Race Equality Schemes have included 
similar objectives to the rest of the UK, e.g., to ‘achieve race equality’ in the delivery of 
public goods and services), but Scotland has also placed a premium on the need to ‘increase 
refugee integration and address race discrimination in Scotland’. The explicitness of the 
second objective is a legacy of asylum dispersal and is not mirrored in England where 
parallel government strategies are split between the Home Office – which emphasises 
restricting migration (especially of low skilled workers and those seeking asylum) – and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), which prioritises minority 
‘integration’, respectively. Once again the politics are different too. 
Because of historical population decline there has been a clear recognition that for a 
successful Scottish economy, it is necessary to attract and retain migrants. Since the majority 
of inward migration is international (and not inward from the rest of the UK), Scotland has 
been agitating for a distinct approach precisely because it more immediately relies on 
migration – or is certainly more open about being so – than other parts of the UK. Examples 
of this include the Fresh Talent Initiative and innovations in post-graduation residency rights 
for international students and other activities intended to help meet the Scottish 
Government’s target of matching the EU population average over the period 2007-2017. 
Despite limited powers in migration policy Scotland now gains as a net recipient of 
international migration (which has exceeded emigration every year since 2001).  Add to this 
the fact that Scotland’s population is ageing quicker than in England it is clear why the white 
Paper, Scotland’s Future, explicitly set out its stall for a distinct approach on the grounds 
that ‘the current UK immigration system has not supported Scotland’s immigration policies’. 
To its credit the Scottish Government has been consistent in promoting a vision for an asylum 
policy that honors International covenants, especially the rights and welfare of children – not 
least because the Scottish government has consistently complained about the detention of 
children on Scottish soil from families seeking asylum. The experience especially in the 
central belt of dispersal policies has cultivated some valuable local strategies to facilitate 
settlement and integration, and challenged fears and prejudices. These local responses have 
relied on active stakeholder, voluntary and community sector collaborations that have 
sometimes been articulated in the formulation and refinement of national level discourse and 
policy that is often informed by a skilled (and vocal) third sector facilitated by an effective 
Council on Ethnic Minority Voluntary Organisations (CEMVO). 
The question of citizenship of course goes well beyond migration. In recent years we have 
seen some interesting discussion of what an independent Scotland might do in this area. A 
fascinating summary of policy options is offered by Jo Shaw who shares the view that 
habitual residence will prevail as the criterion for achieving Scottish citizenship, while a 
version of the points based system would apply for new applicants, but in a way that didn’t 
preclude dual citizenship. The challenge for a future Scottish administration would be not 
replicate the existing the UK approach in a way that incorporates its flaws and tendency for 
discriminatory enforcement. 
The obvious point is that citizenship is not simply about naturalisation but about the social 
and political field in which – in our case – minorities are confident and audible enough to 
participate in Scotland. In addition to the technical questions of equality of opportunity, some 
of this has to do with a sense of ownership over Scotland. Here there is a longstanding trend 
of self-identification and claims-making on Scottish identities by ethnic minorities. The 
important aspect here is the subjective confidence and willingness amongst minorities to 
stake such a claim. Yet it is not clear how (if at all) the stronger claims that come with this 
will be met. 
For example, in a recent British Academy funded study of national identity (Meer, 2013), I 
noted that Scottish political actors frequently point to a number of boundaries for ensuring 
integration and pursuing unity. Two examples include the question of multi-lingualism and 
multi-faithism. Taking the issue of language first, when the question is raised of bringing 
minority other languages into the fold, which are more frequently spoken than Gaelic and 
appear to be taking on distinctive Scottish forms in terms of content and dialect, there is a 
consensus amongst respondents that Scottish Urdu and Scottish Punjabi could not warrant a 
status as one of Scotland’s national languages. In this assessment, historical multilingualism 
is seen as a feature of the national identity whereas migrant languages are potentially 
fragmentary. 
A more charged illustration, however, concerns the prospects for religious pluralism, 
especially corporate recognition where the state-church relationship is pluralised. There are 
some very good reasons to be cautious about seeking to mirror one religious settlement in the 
present with something from the past, and it must be stressed that in my research all Scottish 
political actors respondents were positive (often very positive) about the fact of religious 
pluralism in Scotland. What is interesting in their responses was each framed the question of 
formally recognizing religious pluralism – as opposed to the fact of religious pluralism – 
within a register of sectarianism, and therefore resisted it. In this respect it may well be true, 
as the late Bashir Ahmed (Scotland’s first ethnic minority MSP –of the SNP) put it, that ‘it 
isn’t important where you come from, what matters is where we are going together as a 
nation’. 
What this requires us to do however is separate the identity of a nation from people’s national 
identities – but in a manner that allows us to remake both. The paradox is that we are at an 
earlier stage of this in Scotland even while race equality is increasingly marginalised in 
England. 
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